In 2012, the United Nations approved new Guidelines on the Use of Armed Private Security
[476] Introduction United Nations (UN) agencies, funds and programmes have employed Private Security Companies (PSCs), i.e. firms which provide static and mobile protection, for many years.
Nevertheless, little was known about this practice until recently. 1 In 2010, a report by the UN Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries noted that the UN was 'using the services of private military and security personnel in some of the conflict zones in which it is engaged'. 2 Subsequent UN publications acknowledged the contracting of PSCs for 'guard services for United Nations offices, residential security for staff, and support for humanitarian activities, including risk assessments, threat analysis, logistical support and contributing to the development of security strategy'. 3 The controversy which has surrounded the employment of PSCs during the international interventions in Iraq and
Afghanistan has contributed to the reticence of the UN to make public its growing reliance on PSCs. High profile incidents, such as the shooting of 17 Iraqi civilians by employees of the American PSC Blackwater, have given the industry a bad name. The lack of binding international regulations for the global security industry remains a cause for concern.
To address these issues and prevent reputational damage to its agencies and operations the UN has adopted new Guidelines on the Use of Armed Guards. These guidelines hold the potential to not only enhance the quality of security services contracted by the UN, but also raise professional standards within the industry more generally by serving as a model for other consumers and companies. However, academic research and contracting best practices identified by industry associations and major clients such as the United States (US) suggest that there is considerable room for improvements. In the following, this article identifies six areas related to scope, content and enforcement where revised guidelines could lead to a significant strengthening of the In addition, an APSC must provide training for its guards on the ICoC, the company's use of force policy and weapons manual as well as on issues such as firearms handling, counter-terrorist search, hostile surveillance and reconnaissance, human rights law and its applications, integrity and ethical awareness, preventing sexual harassment and an overview of the UN security management system as relevant. 13 Management and oversight include daily operations reviews and monthly performance reviews by UN staff. 14 The model contract sets out these requirements in detail. 10 Id., at 3. 11 Id., at 6. 12 Id., at 7. 13 Id., at 9. 14 Id, at 10-11.
Areas for Improvement
The APSC Guidelines are a significant advancement over the UN's Use of Armed Guards policy which has been in place since the publication of the United Nations Field Security Nevertheless, the APSC Guidelines are characterized by several limitations because their main objective is to minimize 'reputational risk' to the UN. 17 As a consequence, the APSC Guidelines pay no attention to security services other than armed guards; they show limited concern for the impact of PSCs on the UN's security posture and environment; they do not realize fully the UN's potential as a norm entrepreneur in the international regulation of PSC services; and they make few provisions to ensure effective implementation. In the following, this article makes six recommendations for improvement.
Expansion of Scope
The APSC Guidelines' restriction to armed security contractors is its most significant Guard Force Guidelines were not revoked, but had already 'faded away' before they were formally replaced by the UNSMS (2012).
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Since the majority of PSCs employed by the UN provide unarmed security services it is vital to expand the scope of the guidelines in order to prevent potential scandals and 
Specification of Conditions for the Use of Security Guards
A second area for improvement concerns the development of stricter conditions for the use of private security guards. Although the APSC Guidelines state that armed guards should only be contracted 'on an exceptional basis', this policy -which has been in place since 1996 -has done little to prevent the extensive employment of security guards by UN agencies and missions. 26 One reason for the proliferation of contract guards is the APSC Guideline's incorrect assumption that 'armed security services will normally be provided by alternate member States or the appropriate security entity within the United Nations clarify and restrict the circumstances in which armed and unarmed security guards may be deployed. New guidelines could achieve this by identifying minimum threat levels, which are established by the UN's regular threat assessments, above which the use of unarmed and armed security guards may be considered. Such a rule would prevent that guards are used to address perceived vulnerabilities where the probability of harm is low. More generally, it seems advisable to restructure the UN Security Risk Management approach in such a way as to establish threat levels before analysing vulnerabilities in order to ensure that mitigating measures are only implemented where necessary.
Specification of Standards and Training Requirements
The APSC Guidelines contain an extensive list of professional standards and training requirements for companies employed by the UN. Nevertheless, they, too, can be improved in two respects. The first improvement concerns the requirement that an APSC must be a 'member company to the 
Expansion of Contract Management Capabilities in the Field
The UN's contracting and contractor management processes in the field as envisaged by the ASPC Guidelines and structured by the UN Security Management System can also be 40 to carry out these additional inspections and whether checks will be very thorough. 46 US experience from multilateral interventions shows that contractor management often takes a backseat to other duties, in particular in volatile environments where contract guards are most likely to be used. 47 Moreover, security officers are often untrained in issues of contractor oversight or, as noted above, lack direct authority over contractors.
To remedy these matters the guidelines should make provisions for spot checks of companies and their employees as well as the verification of training, and tighten security contractor management by giving more authority to field security officers. of military units, paramilitary groups and police units. 48 For security contractor management the UN should allocate additional personnel. Best practice is suggested by the US Government Accountability Office (GAO) which has reviewed extensively the problem of security contractor management in multilateral military interventions. 49 Among others, GAO advocates that 'Reliance on private security contractors should be accompanied by greater use and emphasis on vetting, training, authorizing arms, and weapons control; post-convoy debriefing, locational tracking, and video monitoring; and more thorough and comprehensive management'. 50 In addition, GAO recommends the hiring or training of specialized contract management personnel who can be deployed
[487] with international missions. 51 The UN can learn from these recommendations. Rather than expecting field security officers to carry out extensive monitoring of PSCs, contractor management should be recognized as a separate function. Contract managers should have relevant security service and management expertise in order to carry out contractor selection, contract design, contractor performance reviews and contractor management. In order to operate effectively they and field security officers also need direct authority over contractor personnel.
Performance Reviews Focused on Security Outcomes
Suitable performance measures are an important factor in the monitoring of security contractors. The performance criteria identified in the APSC Guidelines, however, are characterized by a common weakness. corruption or harassment by security guards. Finally, the effectiveness of security activities and capabilities can be assessed through mock attacks or tests. In contrast to the checks of capabilities and personnel specified in the APSC Guidelines, these tests should examine the responses of security contractors to situations such as attempted theft, disorder or hostilities.
Sanctions for Contractor Misperformance and Misconduct
A final area for improvement concerns the UN's responses to contractors which are accused of misperformance or misconduct. In most circumstances, the UN envisages that 'any performance issues or concerns identified' can be addressed through 'remedial action'. 58 In cases where such action is not possible, actions. 64 The contract emphasizes that the US government 'reserves the right to direct the Contractor to remove an employee from the work site for failure to comply with the standards of conduct'. 65 While sanctions are important, incentives in the form of performance-linked rewards are another way to encourage contractors to raise their standards. 66 The US government has, thus, included positive and negative incentives in its World Wide Security Services Contract. 67 Since it is easier to withhold incentive fees or reduce performance-based payments than to require reimbursements for failure to conform to a contract, incentives can be a very useful method for contractor management if implemented correctly.
Conclusion
The publication of the UN's Guidelines on the Use of Armed Private Security Companies in 2012 has been an important signal for an industry which still lacks international regulation.
Nevertheless, research, experience and best practices from other clients suggest that there is still room for improvement. This article has made six recommendations which would enhance the UN's control over security contractors and facilitate higher professional Notwithstanding these recommendations it must be noted that guidelines, rules 
